Graciela Kennally-Presslaff
2011 marked a global shift as the Arab Spring and its violence sparked revolutions in 6 countries. Perhaps no place within this movement or without holds as much significance as Tahrir Square. It was in Tahrir Square where people first marched in the “day of rage,” Tahrir Square where people gathered after Mubarak resigned, Tahrir Square where the Muslim
Brotherhood gathered before they seized power, Tahrir Square where people fought, died, wept, and celebrated, rejoicing in their triumphs, and wallowing in their defeats. Yet it was from the safety of the Gulf states, that Ahmed Abulhassan sent out a tweet that would coordinate medical aid for protestors in the Square in less than 5 minutes (Tufecki 54).
Violence from the state seems to have no end or beginning. But the modern revolution
has added a new tool to its collection: While its usage and effect are controversial, Facebook and Twitter are highly influential. Zeynep Tufekci’s Twitter and Teargas contests that social media
could perhaps create a vulnerability, in effectiveness, censorship, and leadership.
Zeynep Tufekci separates the book into 3 parts, each evaluating Twitter and Facebook’s role before, during, and after 3 major movements: The Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, and Istanbul’s Gezi Park. I have divided her central claim into 3 distinct themes: Effectiveness,
Censorship, and Leadership. Effectiveness
Tufecki cites Ahmed as an example of effectively using Twitter to organize. Former
hashtags could block urgent calls for help, it wasn’t clear who would handle certain tasks, and which ones were completed (54). By setting up a centralized hub and providing transparency and
accountability, “within a day, [Ahmed and three] young people were coordinating almost all supplies for ten filed hospitals” (57).
Additionally, “more than a quarter of protestors surveyed had first heard about the
protests on Facebook” (133). Past movements such as civil rights required a tremendous amount of time and effort to organize, print, and arrange high-quality sound systems, preassigned
parking spaces, portable toilets, food, and water. The overall prep for the march on Washington took 6 months and 2 months to organize (69).
She also made an argument against its effectiveness stating that people will assume that others will attend protests in their place, making it more likely for people to be uninvolved (87). People also lack the trust that protests will be able to achieve goals through institutional or electoral means (112). Tahrir Square remains a primary example of this, as years of protest led to no desirable solution.
Censorship
Tufecki helps us unpack censorship which includes online monitoring, tactics to shut off WIFI, and a ban on certain apps, and their possible ineffectiveness. For example, she states that “cutting off communication between the people at home and the people at Tahrir Square was an ineffective form of censorship because there was little to keep secret about the protest’s existence or its location…” and people were more likely to join the protests because they were left in the
dark about what was happening (226). This also increased global and domestic attention.
Thus, she argues that modern-day censorship should not come as a total denial of access, “but as a denial of attention, focus, and credibility” (228). “Asserting not only the authenticity of identity (I posted this picture) but also the veracity of its metadata (information about the content
rather than the content itself: this picture was taken on this date and in this place) has become a key challenge for activists and social movements” by creating fear and doubt (247).
Leadership
Online mobilization has led to a decentralization of power; There’s no one leader. Tufecki puts Civil Rights icon Bayard Rustin, who was the March on Washington’s chief organizer (66) in stark contrast to the modern leftist organizers who often lack “decision-making structures, mechanisms for collective action, and norms within… movements…. [which] often results in a tactical freeze in which these new movements are unable to develop and agree on new paths to take” (77). This fault also allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to gain power, as there was no
movement leader to take over when Mubarak stepped down, although it allowed the movement to become more democratized.
She explains the physical laboring process of organizing is often lost in civil rights
history and within modern movements itself. But perhaps having no leader could be a strength as organizers have recognition but not power, and therefore cannot become corrupted by
government intimidation (78).
While I found Tufekci’s analysis relevant, her argument is better understood by those with background knowledge of social movements. I have much familiarity with Tahrir Square and its significance in social movements but knew little about Gezi Park. I could understand the dire
need for medical supplies, just as Ahmed could because I have seen many of the clips shared
from protests of injuries, I knew what the landscape looked like, I knew what vehicles the police were using, I understood why the Muslim Brotherhood was able to gain power. Thus, Tufekci’s arguments are strengthened by our understanding of social movements but are lost by her
inability to make a personal connection. Perhaps this is not a reflection of her writing but of the deep complexities of the social movements she picked.
Tufekci’s work is particularly inspiring as we watch the Free Palestine movement unfold before our very eyes. Thus, implications of decentralized leadership, effectiveness, and
censorship, have deeply impacted how the world views Israel as either friend or foe. In addition, the pictures circulating on social media of decapitated bodies bring us back to this question of
desensitization and perhaps a relapse in how people connect with the movement. Once seen as a shock factor, graphic depictions of political protest were used to move people such as Civil
Rights and BLM. While they still hold much significance, they have certainly been looked upon differently in recent years.
Nonetheless, Tufekci’s insight on mass mobilization and protest in the 21st century is
valuable to understanding how Free Palestine continues to evolve. With posts on Instagram and Twitter urging people to mobilize and disrupt so people cannot return to business as usual, Palestine, as well as many others seem to be in a battle for people’s attention and sympathy.
Thus, Twitter and Teargas remains timeless, as both online and physical organization become increasingly intertwined, as Tufekci challenges our existing perspectives on social media and physical landscapes.